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Abstract 
This paper contributes to debates about the ontological turn and its implications 
for democracy by proposing an experimental understanding of political 
ontology. It discusses why the shift from epistemology to ontology in STS has 
proved inconclusive for the study of politics and democracy: the politics of 
non-humans has been assumed to operate on a different level from that of 
politics and democracy understood as institutional and public forms. I 
distinguish between three different understandings of political ontology: 
theoretical, empirical and experimental. Each of these implies a different 
approach to the problem that non-humans pose for democracy. Theoretical 
ontology proposes to solve it by conceptual means, while empirical ontology 
renders it manageable by assuming a problematic analytic separation between 
constituting and constituted ontology. This paper makes the case for the third 
approach, experimental ontology, by analysing an empirical site, that of the 
ecoshowhome. In this setting, material entities are deliberately invested with 
moral and political capacities. As such, ecoshowhomes help to clarify two main 
features of experimental political ontology: 1) ontological work is here not so 
much relocated from theory to empirical practice, but distributed among actors 
and entities involved in them, and 2) normative variability does not just pertain 
to the enactment of things, but can be conceived of as internal to political 
objects. From these two features of experimental ontology something follows 
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for democracy as an ontological problem. This problem does not dissolve in 
empirical settings, but these settings make possible its articulation by 
experimental means. 
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1. Introduction2 
The time when it could be considered a provocation to speak of non-human 
entities as participants in social and political life could soon be behind us. No 
longer just an interest of adventurous intellectuals, an expanding range of 
people seem prepared to consider this possibility, and to acknowledge the 
active contributions of objects, technologies and environments to the 
sustenance of social and political community. In areas as diverse as legal 
theory, product design, environmental policy and computer programming, there 
is talk today of the role of things in mediating the bonds that hold polities 
together (Bennett, 2010; Dobson, 2003; see Jasanoff, 2010 for an overview). 
This can be explained as partly an effect of wider empirical developments in 
these areas such as the proliferation of environmental initiatives in policy, 
business, science and culture, and the on-going digitization of many spheres of 
life. In this context, the significance of objects, technologies and settings in 
facilitating social, political and moral life is becoming increasingly obvious, 
and has resulted in an intensification of interest in the precise social, political 
and legal arrangements required to sustain and regulate the contributions of 
non-humans to our forms of life (Blok and Bertillson, 2009). It raises questions 
such as, ‘What kind of legal subject does the atmosphere represent?’ And, 
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‘How can everyday technologies like smart electricity meters enable behaviour 
change?’  
However, we may also ask more open-ended questions about the 
changing status of ideas about the politics of non-humans. What, for instance, 
does it imply for the sensibilities that inform intellectual debates about this 
issue? The idea that non-humans have moral and political capacities has 
occupied social scientists and philosophers for many years, but it holds a 
special place in Science and Technology Studies (STS). The claim that things 
have a politics is one of the central contributions of STS to wider debates in 
social theory, and this claim is often singled out – either positively or 
negatively – as the most distinctive feature of approaches developed in the 
field. Furthermore, it is often argued that recognizing non-humans as social and 
political agents has significant implications for a wide range of sociological 
and political concepts; taking non-humans into account transforms concepts of 
social order, power, and morality (Harbers, 2005; Latour, 2005b). Finally, 
accounts in STS that consider the roles non-humans play in social and political 
life propose a very particular understanding of ontology, one that markedly 
differs from definitions of this term assumed in other fields. In attributing a 
politics to non-humans, one could say, work in STS has rendered ontology 
empirical. I will discuss this double movement in more detail below, but 
debates in STS about the politics of non-humans tend to assume that 
ontological questions cannot be settled by theoretical means. Rather, such 
questions require detailed empirical investigation of social and political 
practices (Latour, 1988; Mol, 2002; Law, 2004).3  
                                                
3 Whether the connection between the politicization of non-humans and the empirization of ontology is 
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One could argue, then, that the politics of non-humans is only the tip of 
the iceberg of a much wider conceptual re-orientation in social and political 
research and theory. It does not just involve a re-conceptualization of the 
material dimension of politics, but of a whole array of other phenomena as 
well, and ontology in particular. However, that the attribution of political 
capacities to non-humans should go hand in hand with an empiricization of 
ontology is by no means self-evident. Indeed, the idea that there is a politics to 
things is increasingly popular today, but on the whole this has not led to a 
wider engagement with political ontology along the empirical lines proposed in 
STS. In political theory, so-called object-oriented ontology and the ‘new 
materialism’ have received much attention in recent years, and this work has 
spawned renewed interest in the role of material and non-human entities in 
politics and democracy (Bennett, 2010; Harman, 2009, Frost, 2008). However, 
while this work extends political recognition to non-humans it tends to remain 
invested in a theoretical definition of ontology (for a notable exception, see 
Bennett, 2010). One could think that this situation offers an opportunity for 
STS to re-assert its distinctively empirical understanding of ontology. But here 
I would like to make a different argument. Insofar as the political capacities of 
non-humans are gaining more widespread recognition today, empirical 
ontology is itself being opened up for questioning. Efforts to re-specify the 
relation between ontology and politics in empirical terms, I will argue, have 
remained limited in some respects. Because of the ways in which ontology has 
been empiricized in STS, the recognition of non-humans as political agents 
took a very particular form. For instance, this recognition did not really extend 
to public forms of political and democratic life. But there are opportunities 
today not just to re-assert but to expand the project of the empiricization of 
ontology, and to adopt what I will call here an ‘experimental ontology’. 
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 In what follows, I will distinguish between three ways of understanding 
the role of non-humans in political and public life, which correspond to three 
ways of understanding the normative role of non-humans, and political 
ontology more widely: theoretical, empirical and experimental. I will discuss 
why empirical ontology provides only a limited way of accounting for the 
politics of non-humans, and why we need an experimental ontology. I will do 
this by turning to a particular site, ecoshowhomes, of which I visited a number 
between 2007 and 2010 in and around London. In demonstrational 
environmental homes, everyday objects and settings are deliberately equipped 
with with normative capacities.4 Accordingly, the politics of objects can here 
be understood as an empirical or ‘experimental’ effect itself: it must be 
regarded as an on-going accomplishment of the setting - as 
ethnomethodologists have put it so well (Garfinkel, 1984, p. viii) - of the 
demonstrational home. I argue that to make sense of this situationally – or 
better: environmentally - accomplished politics of non-humans, we must 
radicalize the empirical understanding of the politics of non-humans. Rather 
than positing that objects simply have normative capacities (or not), we must 
investigate how they become invested with specific normative powers through 
the deployment of particular settings and devices. To begin with, however, I 
would like to say some more about the efforts to develop ontological 
perspectives on politics and democracy in STS and elsewhere.  
 
2. The ontological turn in politics and democracy as an unfinished project 
A turn to ontology in the study of politics has been in the works for some time. 
Authors in fields as diverse as geography, political theory, sociology and 
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cultural studies have argued that the role of objects, animals, and matter in 
political and public life deserves more explicit recognition (Barry, 2001; 
Bennett, 2010; Braun and Whatmore, 2010; Frost, 2008; Hawkins, 2006; 
Latour, 2005a). This work argues that some areas of the social sciences have 
paid insufficient attention to the materiality of politics and democracy, and 
describes how non-human entities – from bees to plastic water bottles and 
home-made food – inspire and organise political and public action. Many of 
these studies refer to STS, and more specifically, to actor-network theory 
(ANT) and ‘material-semiotic’ approaches developed in this field, which have 
long sought to re-insert non-humans in the analysis of social, political and 
moral life (Callon et al, 2001; Irwin and Michael, 2003; Latour, 1988; Law, 
2004).5 It could therefore be argued that recent work on material politics  
‘extends’ ontological perspectives developed in STS to the analysis of political 
and public life, which are then understood as constituting distinctive fields of 
inquiry. 
 Such a characterization is problematic, however, insofar it assumes that 
‘science’ and ‘politics’ or ‘public life’ constitute sharply distinct objects of 
inquiry, which work in STS has precisely contested. In STS, arguments about 
the politics of non-humans are closely connected to the much broader project 
of developing ontological perspectives of science, technology, society and 
politics, highlighting their mutual entanglement. In advocating for a shift from 
epistemology to ontology, STS describes how science and technology change 
the world materially, socially, technologically morally and politically; in so 
doing, STS moves beyond established traditions in philosophy and sociology of 
science (Woolgar and Lezaun, this issue). Whereas earlier scholars approached 
                                                
5 These perspectives find inspiration in a variety of intellectual traditions: phenomenology (Merlau-
Ponty), post-structuralism (Foucault) and post-structuralist approaches in feminism (Butler), radical 
empiricism (Deleuze), the American transcendentalists (Thoreau), and so on. 
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science as principally a form of knowledge, concerned with the representation 
of reality, STS proposes to understand technoscience as a distinct mode of 
intervention, foregrounding the empirical transformations of the world effected 
by these means (Latour, 1988; Law, 2004; see also Hacking, 1983): after the 
introduction of plutonium, the production of new proteins through molecular 
mechanics, and the birth of birth-control pills, we lived in different worlds 
(Hacking, 2004; Latour, 1999).  
This general argument has significant political implications because it 
attributes to science and technology a number of effects normally located in the 
domain of politics. In the account of ontology given in STS, science and 
technology are understood to involve attempts to change the world; they help 
to decide which actors acquire power and influence, and who might emancipate 
themselves. However, this account requires further elaboration and 
specification because, on closer examination, this kind of ontological account 
of politics is quite different from how politics is normally understood: as a 
distinctive activity that depends on specific institutions and requires particular 
procedures or forms of public life (De Vries, 2007). This is another reason why 
it may well be a mistake to say that the ontological perspective that STS has 
developed in accounting for the relations between science, technology and 
society is now being ‘extended’ to politics and democracy. 
Strikingly, several authors who have advocated the ontological approach 
to science, technology and society appear disinclined to apply this approach to 
public life and democracy. While science and technology are today quite 
routinely characterized as devices for the socio-material re-ordering of the 
world, many STS authors have continued to conceive of democracy in terms 
that are firmly located on the representational or epistemic end of the spectrum. 
Democracy is still often defined as a matter of including lay actors in public 
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debates and deliberations about a given issue (Callon et Rabeharisoa, 2004; 
Irwin, 2006; for an exception see Leach, Scoones & Wynne, 2005; see also 
Marres, 2007).6 To be sure, others have argued in favour of making the 
ontological moves that STS advocates in relation to politics and democracy, as 
we see in Latour’s (2005b) playful proposal for a Dingpolitik. But such 
proposals have so far not received a more detailed formulation. 
Equally striking, while some authors in STS have sought to explicate the 
political implications of the broader ontological turn proposed in this field, 
these very authors have on the whole refrained from engaging directly with 
concepts of democracy. These authors prefer to speak of politics in a different, 
post-Foucauldian, register, as principally a matter of the constitution of 
subjects and objects in social practices (Law, 2004; Mol, 1999, 2002). Their 
concept of ontological politics refers to latent machinations of socio-technical-
material arrangements that enable some forms of life rather than others, 
machinations that are not usually detected by the apparatus of political 
analysis. Ontological politics, in other words, is here sharply distinguished 
from the institutional or formal activity of capital ‘P’ Politics (Asdal, 2008; 
Danyi, 2010; Marres, 2009). We could say, then, that the ontological turn in the 
study of political and public life has for some time remained suspended 
between two different kinds of reluctance: the reluctance to ontologize politics 
on the part of those invested in deliberative or dialogic concepts of democracy, 
                                                
6 It is certainly not the case that an ontological perspective on science, technology and society is 
without implications for participation. On the contrary, partly as a consequence of the ontological turn, 
science and technology should be understood as inherently participatory (see Marres, 2009). Accounts 
of science and technology as socio-technical-material modes of ordering have emphasized that lay 
actors and audiences play a far more active and important role in the societal domestication of science 
and technology than epistemic and instrumental perspectives have led us to assume. Classic ontological 
perspectives on science and technology, then, precisely opened up debates about participation, 
emphasising the need to recognize a widened range of actors as participants. However, these earlier 
contributions on the whole did not translate into attempts to re-work formal concepts of public 
participation in democratic theory along ontological lines. 
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and the reluctance to extend notions of ontological politics to the categories of 
the public and democracy. Why is this so?  
 One explanation is that STS authors are reluctant to venture too far into 
normative democratic theory, cognizant of the fact that their principal 
engagement has been with the sociology and philosophy of science, technology 
and medicine (Brown, 2009; Whatmore and Braun, 2010). Others have pointed 
that it is especially difficult to conceptualize the role of non-humans in 
democracy, because to do so is to challenge conceptions of the moral and 
political subject (Verbeek, 2011, Bennett, 2010; see also Marres, 2005). To 
attribute political capacities to non-humans is to disrupt particular assumptions 
about the necessary and ideal attributes of subjects, in particular the post-
Cartesian ideal of autonomy, which posits that the actions and opinions of 
public citizens are not to be informed by their particular, material 
circumstances (for a more detailed discussion of this Cartesian legacy in 
modern political and moral theory, see Verbeek 2011 and Frost 2008). 
Work in STS that moves from epistemology to ontology has effectively 
challenged the ideal of the autonomous citizen, by showing that actors never 
act alone. Indeed, this claim is essential to the idea that non-humans have 
political capacities, because it suggest that what we understand as human 
action in practice depends on associations of humans and non-humans acting in 
concert (Cussins, 1996). On the other hand, ontological approaches in STS 
partially evade the difficulties that non-humans pose for democracy. They 
render this problem manageable without directly addressing it; much work in 
STS takes care not to disturb the fiction of the autonomous citizen. It does this 
by situating heterogeneous actions involving non-humans on a specific 
ontological plane, specifically, on the plane of constituting phenomena, as 
opposed to politics and democracy as constituted phenomena or ideals (see also 
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Marres, 2011). In other words, ontological approaches in STS tend to respect 
an analytic separation in their accounts of public and political life. They 
acknowledge the contributions of non-humans to politics and democracy on the 
plane of constitutive action, the level at which political and public phenomena 
are composed, but at the same time they uphold, or leave undisturbed, the 
validity of classic, humanist public forms on the level of constituted political 
and democratic life, such as that of public debate (Callon and Rabeharisoa, 
2004;  Lezaun, 2007; see also Marres, 2012b). 
This distinction between constituting and constituted democracy makes 
it possible to say that, on the one hand, non-humans qualify as participants in 
social and political life, and on the other hand that there is no need for such 
non-human entities to be explicitly recognized as participants in the public or 
democracy. The participation of non-humans, in other words, does not require 
the modification of the forms of public and democratic life. The distinction 
between constituting and constituted democracy makes it possible to ascribe a 
politics to non-humans while leaving untouched the level on which democracy 
is constituted as a distinct normative ideal or a more narrowly defined 
institutional and public form (see also Papadopoulous, 2010). This solution can 
be recognized especially in earlier work in ANT, which privileged public 
dialogue and the parliament as the relevant democratic forms. However, it 
seems that this solution to the problem of how to insert non-humans in 
democracy is no longer working, as it is becoming more difficult to relegate the 
role of non-humans in political and public life to the plane of constituting 
phenomena, and this insofar as objects, technologies and settings are today 
explicitly invested with normative capacities, in fields as diverse as 
environmental policy and ubiquitous computing. This invites long-time experts 
on political ontology in STS to think again.  
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3. Three versions of political ontology: theoretical, empirical and 
experimental  
As mentioned in the introduction, I think that the reasons for the recent interest 
in the material and ontological dimensions of democracy are partly empirical. 
But before examining these empirical reasons in more detail, I want to discuss 
three ways the relation between ontology and politics can be understood, as 
theoretical, empirical, or experimental ontology (see also Marres, 2009). In this 
typology, theoretical ontology refers to a classic understanding of ontology, 
namely as a theory of ‘what exists’. Here, ontology involves the stipulation of a 
general set of entities and relations on the level of theory or discourse, as a 
general blueprint of the world. This understanding has previously been 
criticized in STS and elsewhere, insofar as it assumes that what exists is given 
rather than made, constructed or performed.7 Political ontology can here be 
taken to refer to the set of definitions that stipulate the features of specifically 
political entities (the state, power, citizenship, interest, democracy, and so on). 
The domain of politics, then, has an ontology like other domains of the world. 
However, we may also include under theoretical ontology a wider application 
of political concepts in metaphysical theory, such as recent arguments in 
speculative philosophy about the ‘democracy’ of objects, which elaborate the 
general ontological claim that that there is ‘no prime mover’ (Harman, 2009).   
Empirical ontology differs from theoretical ontology by proposing that 
the question of ‘what the world is made up of’ cannot be answered wholly in 
theory, but is partly settled in practices that must be studied empirically. This is 
                                                
7 A reader of an earlier version of this article asked whether a performative account of ‘what exists’ in 
itself does not also constitute an ontology. This is certainly a relevant suggestion, but the problem is 
that it encourages us to reduce performativity to a theory. In this article, I want to distinguish between a 
theoretical and an empirical approach to the specification of what ‘what exist’ - and indeed, an 
experimental one. Performative perspectives in STS have been key to the development of the latter 
two. 
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where the shift in STS from epistemology to ontology comes in. Work in STS, 
and especially in ANT, has proposed the term ‘ontological’ to characterize the 
ways in which science and technology intervene in the world. In historical and 
ethnographic studies of the invention of the vaccine, the birth-control pill, and 
genetic technologies, this work detailed how these inventions enabled such 
things as the creation of modern France and a revolution in gender relations. 
ANT proposes to understand these changes as transformations in the 
composition of the world, and in so doing it has developed an empirical 
conception of ontology. This approach claimed that what was traditionally 
considered the province of metaphysics, namely the issue of what the world is 
made up of, is in actuality decided through specific, historical, cultural, 
technological, scientific interventions and as such should be studied in 
empirical terms. As mentioned, this has specific implications for politics 
because ontology is shown to have political dimensions in and of itself. If 
ontologies vary over time, then the matter of what exists may be transformed 
from a given into an issue at stake.  
  What I call ‘experimental ontology’ is both similar to and different from 
empirical ontology. Empirical ontology deals with wide, often under-
acknowledged transformations of what exists, which are subsequently shown 
by STS researchers and others to have political effects. What world do we live 
in? Who has the power? Who gets to be emancipated? By contrast, 
experimental ontology considers the deliberate investment of non-humans with 
moral and political capacities. Here objects, and by extension ontologies, have 
political and moral capacities ‘by design’. Experimental ontology, too, treats 
the issue of ‘what the world is made up of’ as something that gets partly 
decided in empirical practices. But it goes beyond that in a number of ways. It 
directs attention to efforts to purposefully design politics and morality into 
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material objects, devices and settings. Authors such as Verbeek (2005) and 
Lezaun (2011) have examined projects in design, social psychology and 
computing that seek to purposefully equip objects and environments with 
normative capacities, from cars designed to help us burn less fuel, thereby 
enabling us to be good ‘environmental citizens’, to workplace technologies that 
allow workers to act as participants in a workplace democracy. In detailing 
these efforts to design politics and morality into objects, this work shows how 
objects, devices and settings are deployed to specify political and democratic 
forms and ideals in distinctively material terms.  
An experimental perspective on political ontology builds on the 
empirical approach to political ontology and the wider shift from epistemology 
to ontology in STS. It proposes to examine how politics and democracy are 
accomplished through the deployment of devices, objects and settings, rather 
than accounting for politics and democracy in an epistemic register, i.e. in 
terms of the deployment of discourses and ideas only (see for a discussion, 
Marres and Lezaun, 2011). In doing so, experimental ontology seeks to account 
for politics and democracy not only as latent effects, but also as constituted 
forms. In empirical ontology, politics is understood as an attribute of ontology 
in general and there is a politicization of ontology as such. In experimental 
ontology, by contrast, the point is the (re-)specification of specifical political 
categories in ontological terms – it is concerned with the ontologization of 
politics. To elucidate this movement, experimental ontology proposes that we 
must move beyond the distinction between constituting and constituted 
ontology. The deployment of things may affect the very specification of 
politics and democracy as public forms: we must examine how non-humans 
leave their mark on democracy as an ideal. I will analyse this effect in some 
more empirical detail below, but it should already be clear that experimental 
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ontology offers a distinctive way of dealing with the difficulty of how to insert 
non-humans into democracy, which distinguishes it from both theoretical and 
empirical ontology.  
In theoretical ontology this difficulty is addressed through the 
examination of anti-materialist and materialist theories of politics and morality. 
For example, political theorists like Samantha Frost (2008) and Jane Bennett 
(2010) have shown that political ontologies formulated by authors as diverse as 
Thomas Hobbes and Henry Thoreau offer important conceptual resources for a 
theoretization of democratic subjectivity in relational and material terms. Other 
political theorists have proposed to address the difficulty with the aid of a 
prescriptive distinction, that between de facto and de jure modes of 
involvement, proposing to distinguish between material modes of being 
affected by things, events or issues, and discursive or procedural forms of 
getting involved in political affairs (Dobson, 2003; see also Marres, 2012b). 
From this perspective, to use the moral or political language of ‘participation’ 
for the role of non-humans is to muddle two different modalities of being 
‘caught up’ in social and political processes. However, as I will discuss below, 
in practices of material participation it is precisely impossible to keep these two 
levels separate: confusion between material and discusive involvement is 
precisely what material settings of participation produce. (The muddling of 
these modes of involvement was quite adequately captured by the ANT term 
‘enrolment’, which signalled at once complicity and engagement, except that in 
ANT it is understood as a sub-political effect, not a performative 
accomplishment.) 
 Empirical ontology makes possible the aforementioned solution; it 
enables the distinction between constituting and constituted politics or 
democracy. From this standpoint, normatively significant variations in the 
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composition of the world tend to occur on the plane of sub-politics, well below 
the radar of what is recognized in public discourse at the time. This locates the 
political contributions of non-humans on the ‘constituting’ side of the 
constituting/constituted distinction.8 Experimental ontology takes up the 
empirical ontological idea that non-humans have political capacities, but 
deviates from it by undoing the distinction between constituting and constituted 
politics and democracy. In experimental ontology, the politics of non-humans 
cannot as a matter of course be relegated to the plane of constitutive ontology. 
The deliberate investment of things with normative capacities equally operates 
upon constituted ontologies, the forms of public life there enabled.  
The question is what happens to the difficulties associated with the 
insertion of non-humans into democracy as a result. To answer this question, 
we need to gain a clearer understanding of how experimental ontology differs 
from empirical ontology, and in the remainder of this article I will explore their 
differences by examining  particular empirical sites, ecoshowhomes, where 
experimental ontology can arguably be seen at work. In the conclusion, I will 
return to the difficulties that non-humans pose for democracy.  
  
4. The demonstrational ecohome as a device of material participation 
Ecoshowhomes offer a plethora of examples of attempts to equip settings, 
devices and objects with the capacity to facilitate citizenship, and sometimes, 
democracy. Indeed, this particular understanding of political ontology – as 
                                                
8 One could argue that it is not just in relation to politics and democracy that actor-network theorists 
distinguish between a constituting and constituted ontology. Much work in ANT assumes a more 
general distinction between constituting ontology and constituted ontologies. It distinguishes between, 
on the one hand the proliferating human/non-human associations that contribute to the enactment of 
social and political life, and on the other hand the plane of constituted reality that consists of enacted 
phenomena, like the economy, nature, society and so on (Latour, 2005b). Indeed, this type of 
conceptual schema makes it possible to say that phenomena are performed in empirical practice. 
(Which is also to say, use of the constituted/constituting distinction in ANT is part of a performative 
understanding of ontology. What exists is at least partly the consequence of what gets performed or 
enacted into being).   
 16 
involving the deliberate investment of things with normative capacities by 
experimental means – occurred to me during a series of house visits to 
ecoshowhomes in the greater London area between 2007 and 2010.9 During an 
EU-funded research project on technologies of environmental citizenship, I 
participated in public tours of a range of demonstrational environmental homes, 
from the Kingspan ‘carbon-neutral pre-fab showhome’ on display during a 
three-day building industry conference in Watford, to the ‘extreme refurb’ 
undertaken by a group of friends in East London of their Victorian terraced 
house, and which was a participant in London Open House, a yearly event in 
which homes and buildings all over London open their doors to the public. 
Taking public home tours provided an effective way of unlearning the 
assumption that the politics of things is a latent phenomenon. Walking around 
carefully arranged domestic interiors, with tour guides pointing out the 
wonders of triple glazing, solar heating, and biomass boilers, amidst 
exclamations of appreciation of some fellow visitors, it was clear that, in some 
settings, the normative capacities of things are very loudly proclaimed. 
Ecohome demonstrations involved explicit attempts to establish the special 
capacities of domestic objects and settings to enable people to be good citizens, 
act upon environmental issues, and ‘be part of the change’.  
According to the literature, demonstrational environmental houses 
enable a distinctive form of public politics, which Lovell (2007) calls a 
‘politics of exemplification’; the material artefact of the ecohome provides a 
key rhetorical device in recent attempts to secure policy change ‘from the 
outside’ (Lovell, 2007; see also Guy and Moore, 2005). Showhomes have been 
described as ‘technologies of democracy’ in Bijker and Bijsterveld’s (2000) 
study of the role of women advice committees in housing design in The 
                                                
9 This research was made possible by a Marie Curie European Fellowship, entitled Re-constituting 
Citizens, hosted by Mike Michael at Goldsmiths, University of London, Dept. of Sociology. 
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Netherlands in the 1960s. These committees involved prospective users in the 
evaluation of house designs during house tours of prototype homes (Cockburn 
and Furst-Dilic, 1994; see also Oswell, 2008). The ecoshowhomes that I visited 
in and around London could equally be described as material devices of public 
participation, as they were deployed as instruments to engage residents, 
stakeholders and wider audiences in the proposition of environmental living. 
Especially relevant for my discussion here are the ways in which the 
ecoshowhomes I visited were expressly equipped to facilitate environmental 
engagement, using various materio-empirical means such as information 
displays on walls, the labelling of objects like thermostats with information 
about the environmental costs of domestic heating, or rather more drastically, 
translucent panelling inserted in walls to display the insulation.  
 A poster encountered on a door during a tour of the Green Living Eco-
retrofit in the Borough of Islington can serve as a telling example. This 
Edwardian terraced house had recently been renovated to a reasonably high 
environmental standard by the local government in collaboration with a 
housing development corporation called United House as an example of 
sustainable social housing. I was invited to this public tour by a member of the 
local Carbon Action Rationing Group, and one of the first things I noticed upon 
entering the small house was a poster attached to the door opening into the 
living room, which stated: ‘Carbon saving = 50% the technology & 50% the 
way the tenant uses it !!’ (see Figure 1). The poster listed a number of different 
ways of ‘how we engage with residents, to help them make the best use of their 
eco refurb’, including ‘provid[ing] pictures and graphics where possible e.g. 
label local thermostat showing cost’, and ‘putting a limit on some bad practice 
e.g. window opening in cold weather’ (with the added caveat that ‘such 
measures are probably not allowable!’), and finally noting that ‘a Working 
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Party with professionals [is] already working on this problem: Dr Mike P., a 
psychologist at Univ Hertfordshire.’ These points seemed to be underlined by a 
smart electricity meter that just happened to stand on a nearby coffee table,  a 
device for gathering data and providing feed-back about domestic energy 
consumption in so-called real-time.  
 
 
Insert Figure 1 around here: Islington Green Living Re-fit, Islington Council in 
collaboration with United House, July 2008. 
 
This anecdote can help to distinguish an experimental understanding of 
the relation between ontology and politics from an empirical one. Firstly, it 
provides a concrete example of a point I made above. Insofar as we can ascribe 
a politics to things in a setting like an ecoshowhome, this politics can certainly 
not be characterized as a latent, surreptitious force that is exerted below the 
radar of public discourse. To the contrary, in this setting material devices – a 
poster on the door, and the window and thermostat nearby – are deployed in 
order to make a public show of the capacity of domestic environments to do 
normative work, that is, to engage people, to encourage them to act in moral, 
political, and economical ways on environmental issues.10 There is then 
nothing hidden about the fact that things are here enlisted in the enactment of 
environmental participation (though of course this enlistment itself may hide 
other things). For this reason, it would not suffice to say in this case that non-
human entities like doors, windows, heat and thermostats contribute to the 
performance of public engagement. Material entities here do not only inform 
                                                
10 Elsewhere I have discussed the relevance of social studies of public demonstrations to the analysis of 
ecoshowhomes as devices of environmental politics (Marres, 2009, 2012b) 
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the constitution of the phenomenon; they contribute to its specification in 
distinctively material terms.  
In the Islington Green Living Re-fit environmental participation is 
formatted as a particular type of material action, one in which residents engage 
with environmental issues through measureable domestic acts like turning 
down the thermostat or airing a room.11 In this setting, material entities do not 
just contribute to the enactment of participation by enrolling actors on a sub-
discursive level. The deployment of the setting (a living room, a poster on a 
door) here informs the very form of the phenomenon enacted, participation. 
This showhome articulates the involvement of everyday people in 
environmental issues in terms of domestic practices and their modification. It 
locates participation in the home and formats it in terms of everyday material 
action: people are to engage in the issue of climate change by operating 
windows, thermostats, and so on. Which is also to say, the role of non-humans 
in the enactment of a political and moral phenomenon cannot be located here 
either on the side of the distinction between participation as a constituting and a 
constituted phenomenon, but runs across the two registers. 
The particular device of a poster on a door in an ecoshowhome can then 
help to clarify some of the differences between an empirical and an 
experimental understanding of political ontology. Adopting an empirical 
perspective, one could say that a given concept or ideal, say environmental 
participation, is here performed in empirical practice. This reading is certainly 
not implausible. Decoding the poster on the living room door described above, 
one could for instance argue that the concept of co-production, or at least a 
version thereof, is here enacted by material means; an assemblage of social, 
                                                
11 One could ask why the formatting of participation should be defined as ‘ontology’: This is helpful I 
think, insofar as it situations material participation in relation to the wider shift from epistemology to 
ontology discussed above. Material participation is one phenomenon among others which allows us to 
examine what it means to account for politics, public life and democracy in terms not of knowledge 
and representation, but those of intervention and experiment.  
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material, technical and discursive elements, the setting of the ecoshohome 
performs a particular version of sustainable housing, one in which the greening 
of the housing stock requires both a technological and a human contribution as 
stated explicitly on the poster: ‘50% technology + 50% the user’.12 (This 
proposition, as put forward by the Highbury Eco-refit, we should also note, 
provides nothing like the idea of co-production as put forward in STS. On the 
poster described above, as on other visuals on display in different rooms of this 
house, human and technological contributions  are quantified in purely additive 
fashion rather than framed as under-determined, heterogeneous social-technical 
entanglements as in STS.) In such a reading, there is a politics to this material 
device in at least two senses. First, the Islington Green Living Eco-retrofit 
enacts a political reality, one in which residents of social housing participate 
actively in performing environmental change, i.e. the so-called greening of the 
housing stock, and do much of the work of reducing energy demand while not 
necessarily receiving the associated savings in their accounts.13 Second, this 
performance of domestically enabled environmental engagement may intervene 
in the world in different ways, materially, discursively, or socio-technically, for 
example, by enrolling actors such as local communities, governmental 
organisations, and environmental researchers in the enactment of this 
particular, disciplinary version of environmental engagement in and with the 
home (more on this below). 
However, in the Islington Green Living house something else was also 
going on, something beyond the located enactment of environmental 
                                                
12 The poster text quoted above provides an especially transportable account of how this setting 
articulates environmental participation. However, the more complex assemblage of the setting (living 
room, social housing, triple glazed windows, thermostat) is the relevant operator of articulation here, 
and I therefore refer to the poster on a door (next to the thermostat, in a living room, of a social housing 
terraced home in Highbury Islington, and so on). On the importance of the setting as an operator of 
performance, see Woolgar and Lezaun, this issue.  
13 During the question and answer session at the end of the tour, someone asked whether tentants would 
benefit from the energy savings made in these social housing properties. The tour guide did not give a 
clear answer, suggesting this matter had not been resolved or perhaps even received much attention. 
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engagement suggested by empirical ontology. This setting did not just enable a 
particular moral or political phenomenon, environmental engagement, to be 
brought into being. Here, a terraced social housing property, a living room, and 
a thermostat, were expressly equipped so to enable a distinctively material 
form of politics: the enactment of participation in and as domestic material 
practice. In this regard, I would like to propose, the normative project of 
carving out an active role for material entities and settings in participation can 
here be defined as a project of the setting. This implies a different account of 
the relation between ontology and politics than the empirical one.  
The enactment of material participation in the Islington showhome does 
not respect the distinction between constituting and constituted ontology. As 
we have seen, in the Green Living Eco-refit, things do not contribute to the 
enactment of a normative phenomenon, in this case participation, in a latent 
manner. Rather, material settings and things are here themselves equipped to 
play a visible and notable part in the enactment of engagement. The setting and 
its objects here participates in the specification of participation as a normative 
ideal, and perhaps indeed, of democracy, in distinctively material terms: it 
articulates environmental engagement as a form of everyday material action 
(see also Marres, 2011). As such, this ecoshowhome provides the material 
upon which an argument can be lodged against the stance that the politics of 
things does not require acknowledgement on the level of democratic 
procedures, or ideals. There is also a different point to be made here. My 
reading of the ecoshowhome implies a different account than is suggested by 
empirical ontology of who and what does ontological work. One way of seeing 
empirical ontology is to say that it relocates ontological work from theory to 
practice. This approach describes how entities and relations that theoretical 
ontologists posit on an abstract plane are performed in empirical practice. My 
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account of the ecoshowhome so far suggests a different understanding of 
ontology. I argue that the ontological work of specifying the features of a moral 
and political phenomenon –participation - is not so much relocated from one 
domain (theory) to another (empirical practice). Rather, it is distributed among 
a broad range of actors and entities.  
In the Islington ecoshowhome, a range of entities including a poster on a 
door, a thermostat, a smart meter, a tour guide, a living room, community 
activists, as well as a social researcher/theorist all played a role in the 
specification of material participation. And crucially, it is impossible to say on 
which side of the theory/practice divide ontology must be located as a 
consequence. It is not just the case that something which theoretical ontologists 
would locate on an abstract plane is here enacted in empirical practice: the 
specification of participation, its features and constituent elements., The 
articulation of participation is here not so much relocated from theory to 
empirical practice; rather, the specification of participation in material terms is 
here brought about by a broad range of entities which operate in both empirical 
and conceptual modes, to the point that it becomes impossible to clearly 
distinguish between what happens on an empirical plane and what on the 
conceptual.14 The ‘ontological work’ of specifying the features of material 
participation is something  in which the setting, actors, stuff, statements on 
posters, as well as the researching theorist all have parts to play. As a 
consequence, the question is not so much whether theorists (or theory) or 
practitioners (or practice) are specifying a political ontology. The work of 
                                                
14 I am drawing here on the holistic philosophy of science of Pierre Duhem, and the more recent uptake 
of concepts of distributed agency in STS. Following Duhem I am insisting on the distributed nature of 
experimental outcomes: it cannot be conclusively decided if they are an effect of theory, empirical data 
or the experimental apparatus. However, where Duhem made an epistemological argument, I argue that 
this idea of the distributed nature of experimental effects also has implications for an ontological 
account of public experiments, i.e an account that focuses on the role of settings, devices and objects in 
the specification of political, social and moral phenomena (Marres, 2012b).  
 23 
articulating material participation is distributed in a much looser, unsettled way 
among the entities and actors involved (see also Marres, 2012a). 
 
5. Interlude: politics, ontology, and the empirical 
My account so far has implications not only for how we understand the 
relations between politics and ontology, but also those between politics, 
ontology and the empirical. Empirical technologies play an important part in 
the enactment of material participation in the ecoshowhomes, and it seems 
important to say more about this, however briefly, here. The role of empirical 
knowledge and technologies in the conduct of public and political life has been 
a central concern in STS, and what I called above the ‘empiricization’ of 
ontology has been offered as a key contribution to its analysis. So far I have 
suggested that the demonstrational setting of the ecohome brings ontology and 
politics into relation in a distinctive way, and the deployment of empirical 
technologies in ecoshowhomes - and of domestic settings as empirical devices 
-  is crucial in this respect. In this section, I therefore want to clarify what is 
distinctive about the role of empirical devices in the enactment of material 
participation  – and in bringing together politics and ontology – in this case.   
Ecoshowhomes present us with empirical technologies of different kinds 
and in different senses of the phase. Firstly, these homes can be defined as 
empirical settings insofar as they are expressly equipped to facilitate the 
showcasing, or demonstration, of a proposition: environmental living and/or 
sustainable housing (Lovell, 2007; Murphy, 2006). As discussed above, 
ecoshowhomes have various technologies of display embedded in them, which 
serve to publicize their environmental credentials, from a label on a window 
advertising a special type of triple glazing, to an Energy Performance 
Certificate on display in a prominent place. Second, empirical devices also play 
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an important role in securing the status and operation of ecoshowhomes as 
environmental settings. These homes tend to be equipped with various devices 
for the measurement, monitoring and documentation of the performance of 
materials, peoples and settings, from smart meters monitoring energy use, to 
sensors embedded in walls - such as the ‘thermacouples embedded in dwellings 
linked to a data logger to gather performance data,’ in the Highbure Refit,15 to a 
special fan that can be used to test the airthightness of dwellings.16 These 
devices for the detection and display of material performance are critical to the 
articulation of domestic settings as sites for (un)sustainable living: 
measurement is one of the principal means through which a home can be 
defined as more or less environmentally harmful or friendly (Miller, 2005). 
Finally, empirical devices play an important role in the articulation of 
distinctively material modes of participation in and with ecohomes. The 
specification of this mode of involvement, in this setting, seems to critically 
depend on the deployment of devices of ‘environmental sensing,’ to use 
Michelle Murphy’s (2006) helpful term.   
Another example can help to make this clear: the blog ‘The Greening of 
Hedgerley Wood’, which reports on ‘one family’s attempt to save CO2’ in a 
rural house in Oxfordshire, by means of various more or less drastic house 
renovations. One entry on this blog covered the installation of a ground heat 
pump in some detail, and includes a picture of Dean the plumber playfully 
looking at the camera through his refractometer while the caption reads: 
‘Check all the plumbing and electrics and then add glycol to both the ground 
loops. The mix has to be exactly right to avoid freezing without making the 
flow sluggish. Dean checks this constantly with his refractometer until he is 
                                                
15 Brochure, ‘Green Living, Case study of a Victorian flat’s eco improvement,’ United House, 2009. 
16 Phil Clark, The refurbishment challenge: air tightness, Sep 7th, 2009, 
http://zerochampion.building.co.uk/2009/09/07/the-refurbishment-challenge-air-tightness/ (accessed 
July 2011). 
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happy with the level (-1.2)’ (see Figure 2). Further down the page, an account 
of the blogger himself and his wife taking a bath later in the day describes them 
as ‘enchanted’ by the warm water provided by the newly installed heat pump.17  
 
Insert Figure 2 around here: Installation of a Ground Heat Pump at Hedgerley 
Wood, October 11th, 2005 
 
The ground heat pump, then, was here enacted as an engaging thing, through a 
combination of devices that each can be defined as empirical, though for 
different reasons : a refractomater, a photo, a blog post and the taking of a bath. 
Each of these instruments enabled the enactment of material form of 
implication, an object-oriented mode of absorption or involvement with the 
domestic setting, and its wider environment. And this particular deployment of 
empirical devices to perform participation brings ontology, the empirical, 
politics – and the public - together in a distinctive way, one that brings to mind 
recent accounts in STS, but also can be distinguished from them.  
No doubt the most familiar way of establishing the relation between the 
empirical and the public in STS,  is through reference to a slogan of classico-
modern empiricism, that “seeing is believing”: to witness an experiment is to 
be constituted as its public (see Shapin & Schaffer, 1989). This slogan invokes 
an epistemic understanding of empiricism, proposing as it does that knowledge 
is principally a matter of sense perception. Taking issue with such a narrow 
mentalistic understanding of empiricism, STS scholars have added social, 
technological, literary and political accounts of how this type of empirical 
‘belief’ actually comes about in scientific and technological practices. Recent 
studies in STS, and elsewhere, have extended this account by arguing that 
                                                
17 ‘The Day Arrives’, The Greening of Hedgerley Wood, Tuesday, October 11, 2005. Available at: 
http://www.hedgerley.net/greening/?p=55 (accessed July 2008). 
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empirical devices enable the performance of participation in ‘an ontological 
way’, proposing that in experimental settings participation itself is mediated by 
things, technologies and matter, rather than by the epistemic means of 
discourse and ideas (Barry, 2001; Girard and Stark, 2007; Latour, 2005a; see 
also Marres, 2007). This work insist on the material efficacy of empirical 
technologies in facilitating public participation.18 Devices like Powerpoint 
presentations and architectural models successfully draw people in: they are 
effective because they engage actors through their senses and as embodied 
beings (Barry, 1998). These accounts tend to concentrate on establishing the 
engaging power of things: they argue that there is an important material 
substrate to the empirical; that as long as empirical technologies are understood 
as acting primarily upon the senses – they are there to present the evidence on 
which basis people may form opinions or act – their capacities to engage 
people materially tends to go under-acknowledged. In my examples from 
ecoshowhomes, however, the material powers of engagement of empirical 
technologies are not under-acknowledged. Here, empirical devices are 
deployed to explicate the engaging capacities of material things, as in the case 
of the labelled thermostat or the bathwater heated by a ground pump (on 
explication, also see Muniesa and Linhardt, 2009; see also Woolgar, 2005).19 
                                                
18 Am I saying that there is some special connection between ontology and materiality? In the 
introduction to this special issue, Woolgar and Lezaun question whether ontological accounts should 
necessarily privilege the material dimension of things. I disagree with them on this point: to make a 
move from epistemology to ontology is to shift from a preoccupation with the ‘representation of the 
world’ to a focus on ‘intervention in the world.’ This is to move from a situation in which it is possible 
to speak of things being ‘merely’ material (as discourse is the primary plane of normativity) to one in 
which materiality emerges as a crucial register of normativity.  
19 Ecoshowhomes arguably provide a public stage for the conferral of capacities of engagement to 
things, suspending a singular answer to the question of who or what is doing the engaging (Marres, 
2009). Is it the ground heat pump that is engaging the inhabitants of Hedgerley Wood, or is the blog 
engaging us as readers, or do these operations presuppose one another? Is it the bathtub, or the issue of 
climate change that draws us in, or both? In generating such confusion, the ecoshowhome arguably 
enables an environmentalization of participation. That is, perhaps we can follow here David Oswell’s 
(unpublished communication) intriguing suggestion that participation in domestic settings literally 
takes on an environmental aspect. It takes the form of a milieu. To use a trope that is often used in STS, 
the capacity to engage is here distributed among heterogeneous entities, to the point that it would not 
be quite accurate to attribute it to a singular actor or cause (Suchman, 2005). However, I am less 
interested in these constitutive politics of engagement, and so will not explore this further here. 
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This implies a different understanding of the relation between the empirical, 
politics, ontology and the public. 
Accounts that emphasize the implicit material power of empirical 
devices preserve an important feature of the classic distinction between the 
empirical and ontology. Ontology is classically defined as what transcends the 
empirical, whereas the empirical is supposed to involve a limitation to what is 
observable. Materially sensitive accounts of empirical devices  problematize 
this distinction, as they highlight how such devices do not just facilitate 
observation, but equally intervene materially, in the organisation of 
phenomena. However, these accounts uphold a key assumption of empirical 
ontology: they suggest that material effects occur outside of the empirical 
framework strictly speaking, insofar as they characterize them as latent and 
implicit. By contrast, if we approach empirical devices as instruments of 
explication, which may help to articulate the normative capacities of things – 
i.e their capacity to facilitate environmental participation – in public, there is 
nothing implicit about the material effects they enable. In the first case, the 
material efficacy of empirical devices is posited outside the empirical frame, 
and below the plane of democratic forms. In the second case, empirical devices 
allow for the display of material efficacy inside the frame of the empirical 
setting, and arguably, these devices assist in the specification of material 
engagement as a distinctive mode of public involvement.. It’s a bit of a 
headache, but politics, ontology, the empirical, and the public have to be taken 
in at once.  
 
6. Experimentalizing ontology: the normative variability of objects   
Why refer to this particular way of bringing politics, ontology, and the 
empirical together as ‘experimental’ ontology? To be sure, what I have called  
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an empirical approach to political ontology equally focuses our attention on 
experimental settings, whether in the shape of public demonstrations of 
scientific inventions or surgical theatres, where various entities are enacted, 
interferences in reality are made, or the composition of the world is durably 
affected. For this reason, indeed, these ontological interventions could be called 
‘experimental’ just as well. However, one reason for reserving the word 
‘experimental’ for the more openly political interventions under discussion 
here, is that they involve tentative articulations of uncertain forms of public 
life: they carve out forms of participation which do not necessarily have a solid 
reference in prevailing understandings and theories of the public (see on this 
notion of the experiment, Kelty, 2005; Jimenez, forthcoming). An empirically 
equipped setting like the ecoshowhome, then, makes possible an experiment in 
the ‘materialization’ of participation: to establish as a viable proposition the 
enactment of public engagement – a key form of democratic life - by material 
means (a thermostat, a home, taking a bath). In this last section, I want to add 
one further explanation for why this in my view opens up an experimental take 
on political ontology, an explanation which insists on the democratic potential 
of material settings.  
 A demonstrational site like the ecoshowhome, one could argue, helps to 
render political ontology variable. I mentioned in the Introduction that the 
commitment to render ontology empirical and to render it political often go 
hand in hand, in STS as well as elsewhere. One way to explain why the two 
movements should occur together is to point to this third operation upon 
ontology: to render ontology empirical is to render it variable. To say that the 
question of ‘what exists’ is partly settled in empirical practices is to render 
ontology dynamic; the composition of the world must now be considered 
changeable. On a general level, this means that empirical ontology challenges a 
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classic feature of theoretical ontology. Ontology has often been taken to 
describe the stable features of the world, with the empirical connoting the 
merely temporary upheavals in the fleeting world of appearances, to use the 
philosophical parlance.20 Ascribing to science and technology the capacity to 
transform the composition of the world, STS has often claimed that ontology 
must be understood in more dynamic terms. And it is this changeability of what 
exists that renders ontology political for if what exists may vary, current states 
of affairs may be strengthened, contested, and undone through intervention.21   
It has been debated, in STS as well as elsewhere, how exactly this 
ontological variability is to be understood. Classic arguments in ANT about 
variable ontology focused on what we might call the ‘constitutive variability’ 
of the world. As discussed, work in this area has characterized science and 
technology as special agents of ontological transformation (Hacking, 2004; 
Latour, 1999). Drawing on this work, more recent studies have foregrounded 
what we might call ‘performative variability’ on the ontological level. Here the 
point is that there is variation in what the world is made to be in different 
practices (Law, 2009; Mol, 2002). Ontology is variable insofar as a given 
object is enacted differently accross different practices in space as well as time. 
Arguably, this latter form of ontological variation can be observed in 
ecoshowhomes too. The homes I have discussed so far came in very different 
shapes and sizes – from a refurbished Victorian social housing property to a 
newly built pre-fabricated ‘affordable home’ to a rural, privately-owned home, 
                                                
20 In classical philosophical ontology, there is plenty of dynamics too, of course, as in Heracleitus 
‘everything flows’ or Lucretius’ ontology of the swerve, according to which worlds come about 
through contingent encounters of moving atoms. Arguably, however, such ontologies themselves 
provide the solace of endurance: the world may be in flux, but the ontology of the swerve remains.  
21 This feature of experimental variability also returns in work on civic epistemology, as in the 
variation among national experimental cultures studied by Jasanoff (2005). However, such work does 
not generally take an interest in ontological variations explicated with the aid of experimental devices.  
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and so on. As such, these homes enable very different enactments of 
sustainable living, and of environmental participation.22 
The Highbury Green Living Re-fit enables a rather disciplinary type of 
environmental living, as the domestic setting is here invested with punitive 
powers of engagement (see also Hobson, 2006). As mentioned, the thermostat 
may not go beyond a certain temperature, and a smart meter makes it possible 
to detect so-called ‘bad practices,’ like opening a window (the humorous 
presentation of these possibilities makes little difference, it seems to me, to the 
normative capacities thus articulated). In the stories coming out of Hedgerley 
Wood, by contrast, the investment of the setting with captivating abilities takes 
on a rather more enchanting aspect. As enticingly warm bathwater brings home 
the point of a newly installed heatpump, this ecoshowhome arguably enables 
an embodied, affective mode of engaging with the environment (Murphy, 
2006). In yet another case, a terraced Victorian house in East London subjected 
to an extreme eco-refurb, the ecoshowhome was equipped to demonstrate the 
bureaucratic and political obstacles encountered during the renovation process. 
During a building permission party in said house, they hung the transcripts of 
negotiations with Hackney Council on the wall, including references to 
neighbors who had objected about the visual pollution caused by the solar PV 
panels they had proposed for the roof.  
 Ecoshowhomes, then, enable a spectrum of different forms of 
environmental participation. This performative range of the device seems key 
to its affordances as a political instrument: to curate an ecoshowhome is not 
                                                
22 Studies of sustainable architecture tend to foreground this variation, with analyses focusing on 
different types of environmental housing, and the different concepts, values or visions of the 
environment, sustainability and ecology that they embody. Some are ‘carbon-neutral’ while others are 
‘locally sourced’, some are gadget-rich while others derive energy savings from their design, and 
arguably each of these features invoke a different larger vision of the sustainable future (Guy and 
Moore, 2005). These studies, however, tend to examine material settings for the values expressed in 
them, and are thus not necessarily interested in the normative capacities of material entitites as such. I 
discuss this elsewhere (Marres, 2012b). 
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just to intervene in the realm of environmental policy as if from the outside, but 
to add a proposition to those already in circulation about what constitutes 
environmental housing from the inside out, and an attempt to elaborate and 
differ from other such propositions (see also Marres, 2012a). However, 
ecoshowhomes do not just enable variations among the enactments of 
environmental participation. They also facilitate a different type of ontological 
variation, the normative variability of objects themselves.  
An example can help to make this clear. The London-based filmmaker 
and lecturer Polly Nash maintained a blog on which she recounted her efforts 
to live on a minimum energy budget for the duration of one month. Hosted by a 
South London community project, the Climate Action Network of Herne Hill, 
and inspired by an environmental living manual produced by ‘The Ministry of 
Trying to Do Something About It’, the blog details Nash’s practical efforts to 
radically cut down on domestic resource use (water, electricity, gas), providing 
minute descriptions of the resulting shifts in everyday routines. In the last 
entry, Nash looks back on the experiment: 
 
Some of the things I have done during this period have been marginally 
more time consuming, brushing the carpet for one, filling up buckets and 
moving them from room to room, but I spend less time in the bath room 
washing [..] I have stopped running the tap without either a carton, a 
cup, a pan or a bucket underneath or at the very least the plug in. Rather 
than automatically turning the tap to wash my hands, I reach for the 
margarine tub and scoop out some old water from a bucket and pour it 
over them. I see no reason why not to continue with this. I only wish we 
could get a water meter.   
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Polly Nash, Ration me up blog, April 30, 200923 
 
The blog post features a photo zooming in on a brush in Nash’s hand cleaning a 
carpet, providing a quite literal illustration of the myopic vision that 
environmental living is sometimes said to induce, but also arguably, of the 
material awareness enabled by a setting like this (see Figure 3).  
 
Insert Figure 3 around here: With brush, Polly Nash, Ration me up blog, April 
30, 2009. 
 
 On one level, this account provides another example of the occasions 
provided by demonstrational homes, including homes like Nash’s made 
demonstrational, to explicate the normative capacities of things. Material 
activities like brushing the carpet and washing one’s hands highlight the 
captivating power of things and their ability to facilitate environmental 
awareness or a heightened sense of the setting, of the stuff involved in their and 
our maintenance, and of the wider material, technical and social conditions for 
everyday life.24 In ecoshowhomes, things may acquire a normative charge, and 
this may be indicative of a particular kind of ontological variability, one in 
which the normative charge of objects varies. In the accounts above, mundane 
activities like bathing and cleaning come to resonate with wider environmental 
concerns such as CO2 emissions and the need to live with scarcity. Material 
practices that are marked by their utter ordinariness here acquire a more 
exceptional capacity to clarify the environmental conditions of life. Further, in 
                                                
23 Day Thirty, final day. Herne Hill Climate Action Network, Saturday, April 24th, 2010. Available at: 
http://www.hernehillcan.org/rationmeup-blog/day-thirty-final-day (accessed July 2010). 
24 These projects draw on very different experimental traditions, including the positivistic tradition of 
empirical building research (Ganzevles, 2007; Murphy, 2006), and the counter-cultural genre of the 
experiment in living (Marres, 2012a). We should of course be careful not to attribute too much 
coherence to these initiatives.   
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these examples, material entities also gain a certain liveliness: scooping water 
or taking a bath are themselves marked by a peculiar dynamism, and this 
‘happening’ nature of everyday material things seems crucial to their ability to 
captivate actors and resonate with the issues at hand.25 These accounts of 
environmental living then put on display a distinctive type of normative 
variability that is internal to objects - the freshly heated bathwater, the scooped 
water - and this variability seems to feed quite directly into the enactment of 
environmental engagement by these material means.26   
Political and cultural theorists have recently invoked 19th century 
theories of vitalism in order to account for the engaging capacities of things 
(Bennett, 2010; Hawkins, 2011). Proposing terms like the ‘vibrancy of ,matter’ 
(Bennett, 2010), they have directed attention to the quasi-animate capacities of 
supposedly inanimate things, insisting that this is critical to the capabilities of 
material entities to play a political or moral role. Significant about the above 
demonstrations of environmental living, in this respect, is that here the 
liveliness of things is invoked with the aid of empirical devices. They suggest 
that liveliness may indeed be key to the normativity capacities of things, but 
that this may be an acquired capacity. The dynamic normativity of objects on 
display in ecoshowhomes is highly artificial in the sense that its explication 
depends on empirical devices, like the diary note (blogpost) and photography. 
The normative capacities of things, including their vibrancy, can here be 
                                                
25 I use the term lively here in a thin sense – to refer to a sense of activity, eventfulness and dynamism 
of materials-in-use. In the examples I discuss here its manifestation critically depends on the 
experimental apparatus (see Lury and Wakeford, 2012). 
26 Elsewhere I have described how practices of electricity meter reading, with the aid of smart meters, 
put on display the capacity of electricity to engage users (Marres, 2009). The brush and the buckets of 
the Herne Hill experiment seem to play a similar role. That is, the domestic setting emerges as 
immensely captivating, resonating with issues of austerity, resource scarcity, climate change, and so 
on.  
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characterized as an accomplishment of the setting.27 We are dealing here with 
an experimental type of normative variability.  
To understand material powers of engagement as artificial is also to say 
that these powers can never be taken for granted. During the tour of the 
Highbury Green Living Refit, a visitor made an enjoyable attempt to undo the 
performance of the engaging gadget, commenting on our tour guide’s 
presentation of the smart OWL electricity meter: ‘Yes, I got one for Christmas, 
but didn’t unpack it yet.’ And this was July. However, this artificiality or 
‘under-determinacy’ of material engagement does not necessarily detract from 
its normative efficacy (Michael and Gaver, 2012). Rather, it suggests a 
particular account of what it means for things to have political capacities, for 
this is not a given or fixed feature or a property of things. Rather, it is a 
capacity acquired with the aid of auxiliary devices. The experimental status of 
the engaging object does not detract from, but adds to its allowances for 
participation.  
An experimental approach to political ontology questions the wisdom of 
assigning political capacities to a given set of entities once and for all, and to 
fix political ontology in this way. It suggests that political and moral roles for 
entities, human and non-human, are enabled by experimental means, and may 
be lost when no longer thus supported. In this, experimental ontology differs 
not just from theoretical ontology, but also from empirical ontology.28  
Empirical ontologies foreground variations in either the composition or 
performance of reality, thereby revealing that there is a political dimension to 
ontological change. However, in detailing how ontologies vary in practice, 
                                                
27 This kind of normative variability of the object is not necessarily something that relies on human 
action to invest meanings and capacities into objects, it seems to me. Participation cannot be relegated 
to either the subjects or objects involved. As mentioned, however, here I am not primarily interested in 
this constitutive aspect of the politics of engagement.  
28 See Marres (2012b) for a more extensive account of an experimental approach to the politics of 
humans and non-humans. There I characterize this approach as non-expectionalist, proposing that non-
humans like humans must rely on a performative apparatus in order to intervene politically.  
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empirical ontology did not entirely free itself from the suspicion that it tried to 
describe the structure of the world, to fix what exists in a conceptual 
framework. It proposed a variable ontology. Experimental ontology, like 
empirical ontology, is firmly committed to recognizing the variable normativity 
of things, but it seeks to account for their normative capacities as themselves 
accomplished by experimental means, and as, in themselves, variable. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Examining a setting like the ecoshowhome helps explicate differences between 
two versions of political ontology, the empirical and the experimental. In 
demonstrational ecohomes, we can observe attempts to perform through 
empirical means political phenomena like environmental participation, but this 
is not the only thing going on. Enactments of participation in ecoshowhomes 
challenge an empirical approach to political ontology, insofar they undo a 
distinction that this approach tends to uphold between constituting and 
constituted phenomena. In ecoshowhomes, entities that are often assumed to 
enter only in the constitution of normative phenomena – mundane objects like 
windows and a thermostat – equally figure as constituted political objects. In 
this setting, non-humans are expressly equipped with democratic capacities to 
facilitate environmental engagement, and they contribute to the articulation of a 
distincively material form of participation. In this respect, the device of the 
ecoshowhome brings into view two salient features of experimental ontology 
as opposed to empirical ontology: the re-distribution of political ontology, and 
the normative variability of objects.  
First, empirical ontology relocates ontological work from theory to 
practice, but experimental ontology proposes further that this work is 
distributed among entities and actors which each operate accross conceptual 
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and empirical registers. Ecoshowhomes, that is, do not just provide an 
empirical setting for the performance of normative phenomena, which non-
empirical ontologists are inclined to posit on the plane of theory. Rather, the 
work of articulating a distinctively material mode of public participation is here 
accomplished in a distributed way, as the material setting, social actors, 
technologies, and the visiting researcher/theorist all contribute to it. It is not the 
case that empirical practice does the work of theory; rather in this setting 
empirical and theoretical work is shared among differently positioned actors to 
the point that this distinction between the conceptual and the empirical 
becomes blurred and unstable. This is evident in that it’s hard to say in final 
terms if it is the empirically equipped living room, the brochures handed out by 
the tour guide, or the visiting sociologist, or all of the above, that define 
participation as a material practice. Second, demonstrational ecohomes also 
help to clarify another issue of importance to both empirical and experimental 
approaches: ontological variation. Ecoshowhomes direct attention to a 
particular type of variation that to my knowledge hasn’t received that much 
attention from empirical ontologists, which is the normative variability of 
objects themselves. As in the case of the bathwater and brush discussed above, 
in ecoshowhomes everyday things may acquire and resonate with the power to 
engage. As I have tried to show, an experimental apparatus such as that of the 
ecohome is crucial in enabling such an a variable normativity of objects.  
From these two salient features of experimental ontology, something 
important follows for the understanding of the problems that non-humans pose 
for democracy. One could say that the setting of the ecoshowhome facilitates 
two critical operations upon this problematic. First, this setting helps to 
dissolve problems of non-humans for democracy. Here, material objects are 
made to play an active and visible role in the enactment of engagement, and in 
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this way, ecoshowhomes help to prove that this is not an impossibility:  
absorption in material settings and activities – from bathing to brushing – are 
central to the very enactment of environmental engagement. And as they 
demonstrate this publically, these settings contribute to the normative project of 
the insertion of non-humans into democracy. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the problem of non-humans is solved in these settings. 
To the contrary, ecoshowhomes also offer many articulations of the problems 
that non-humans pose for democracy. Here, much more clearly than in many 
other settings, we can pose the question of whether and how material practices 
serve as traps in which human actors are held captive by trivial, immediate 
concerns, as in the Islington Green Living Retro-fit. Or indeed, how can an 
activity like cleaning your carpet with a brush rather than a vacuumcleaner be 
taken seriously as a contribution to environmental change? Environmental 
living experiments offer a wealth of observations to demonstrate the 
fundamental importance of mundane activities, and this by virtue of their very 
ordinariness, which ensures the generalizability of observations made in this 
setting: for every electronic device in our homes, there are a billion similar 
ones being switched on in other homes around the world. But this does not 
mean that ecohomes ‘solve’ the problems of material participation, they enable 
their articulation. 
Ecoshowhomes are not just spaces where a more substantial role for 
non-humans in the enactment of participation is currently being carved out. 
They equally offer settings for the articulation of problems of material 
participation, and perhaps, democracy. Should material absorption in the 
setting be welcomed or not in the enactment of environmental engagement? As 
we have seen, ecoshowhomes facilitate many different kinds of normative 
approaches to material participation, from the disciplinary to the affirmative, 
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and as such it also qualifies as a normatively unstable setting. The point of 
adopting an experimental political ontology, I want to propose by way of 
conclusion, is to welcome this destabilizing effect. Not because it will 
necessarily solve, in and of itself, problems of democracy, but because in the 
analysis of participation, we have become too accustomed to fix phenomena in 
terms of their necessary or sufficient features, or by locating them on this or 
that level. Gomart (2002) has characterized experiments as devices for 
producing in-determination, for suspending and/or undoing established 
ontologies, and especially with regard to participation, it seems important to 
learn to value experimental in-determination. After all, the rush to over-
determination – to identify the procedure or apparatus that can secure public 
engagement, and to codify a given device as either democratic or not, has been 
particularly strong in relation to it.  
We then deploy for analytical purposes the experimental capacity of a 
setting like an ecoshowhome to produce in-determination. Environmental 
participation as a phenomenon is here rendered normatively unstable, and this 
can help us to examine its political potential. Again, this does not solve the 
problems that things pose for democracy; it repositions them. Theoretical 
ontology recognizes the problem that things pose for democracy and tries to 
solve it by theoretical means, for instance by providing a conceptual 
formulation of the political agency of humans and things that demonstrates that 
the two are not mutually exclusive. Empirical ontology does not so much solve 
but dissolve the problem in a double move. It proposes that: 1) the problem is 
predicated on a false assumption, that action originates in the naked individual; 
and 2) there is no real need to re-construct theories of democratic participation 
to accommodate non-humans, as they already contribute to its enactment in 
practice. Experimental political ontology offers a different approach. It 
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proposes that the investment of non-humans with political capacities, their 
insertion into democracy, is a project of experimental settings. Experimental 
ontology rejects the idea that the problem of non-humans for democracy is 
merely a problem of theory. It is also a problem of practice, and we should not 
assume any simple distinction between the two. In this way, experimental 
ontology simply elaborates a point long advocated by empirical ontologists, 
which is that attempts to conclusively separate the empirical from the 
theoretical, and to bracket the one while dealing with the other, does not do 
justice to what happens in practice. 
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